New Directions for the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: A Commentary by Weiss, Edith Brown
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 65 
Issue 2 Symposium on Prevention of 




New Directions for the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: A 
Commentary 
Edith Brown Weiss 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edith B. Weiss, New Directions for the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: A Commentary, 65 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 375 (1989). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol65/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE GREAT LAKES WATER
QUALITY AGREEMENT: A COMMENTARY
EDITH BROWN WEISS*
Professor Francis has accurately placed groundwater contamination
in the context of Canadian-United States pollution control efforts., He
has provided a thorough and thoughtful summary of the role of the little
understood International Joint Commission (IJC) in implementing the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978. International water pol-
lution is a much more difficult problem for countries than boundary
water allocation and navigation protection, so it is not surprising that to
date the IJC has focused on research rather than implementation and
binational dispute resolution. Implementation is, however, the next logi-
cal step in Great Lakes pollution control. IJC data will contribute to the
pressure for more effective implementation and disputes will follow. This
comment takes the next step suggested by Professor Francis' analysis and
outlines the possible dispute mechanisms open to Canada and the United
States.
The Great Lakes represent the largest fresh water system in the
world. The efforts of the United States and Canada to control pollution
of the Lakes dates to the early part of this century. More recently, the
1972 and 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements 2 have been
widely recognized as pioneering efforts to control pollution in a shared
river basin and ecosystem. While they have been quite successful in re-
ducing the load of phosphates in the lakes and in lowering the concentra-
tion of certain persistent chemicals, they have not been as successful in
reducing loadings of other pollutants, particularly chemicals which leak
from landfill sites or arrive by airborne transport.
To date there have been few disputes over interpreting and imple-
menting the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978. This is for-
tunate, since the Agreement does not provide for the settlement of
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., Harvard University Law
School, Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley. I thank Jeffrey Gordon and Kathryn Heet for
their assistance.
1. Francis, Binational Cooperation for Great Lakes Water Quality: A Framework for the
Groundwater Connection, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1989).
2. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, United States-Canada, 23 U.S.T. 301,
T.I.A.S. No. 7312; Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T.
1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257 [hereinafter Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978].
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disputes. However, there is substantial concern that there will be dis-
putes in the future over pollution issues, particularly ground water pollu-
tion, which will need to be resolved. Thus, it is appropriate to consider
what dispute resolution procedures might be developed to implement the
1978 Agreement.
I. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
There have been few disputes over implementing the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement. The most important dispute has been the Ni-
agara River controversy a decade ago, which raised the question of
whether seepage of pollutants from landfills into the Niagara River and
hence into Lake Ontario violated the Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment. Since 1973 the Niagara River had been consistently identified by
the Water Quality Board as a problem area in which the specific objec-
tives of the Agreement were not being met. There were many abandoned
or improperly operated hazardous waste disposal sites, some of which
were leaching pollutants into the Niagara River and hence into Lake On-
tario. In 1981, after an investigation of the problem, the IJC issued a
report recommending that a comprehensive study of the Niagara River
be undertaken, that a comprehensive program for the River and the
western end of Lake Ontario be developed and maintained, that govern-
ments prevent any additional discharges to Lake Niagara, and that gov-
ernments review existing permit and discharge requirements to assess
whether they would reduce the level of persistent toxic pollutants enter-
ing the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. 3
It is likely that disputes over implementing the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement will increase in the future. The Agreement's appen-
dices contain highly detailed obligations for controlling lake pollution
which are likely to generate disputes in their application. 4 Disputes re-
garding whether permitting, regulatory, and settlement practices within
each state or province will lead to decreasing levels of seepage of pollu-
tants into the Lakes are also likely to increase. Moreover, as scientific
knowledge advances, there are likely to be more specific standards for
other pollutants written into the Agreement. The frequency of imple-
mentation deadlines specific in the Agreement may also increase. All
these developments, therefore, may lead to more disputes over whether
3. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT ON POLLUTION IN THE NIAGARA
RIVER 8-9 (Jan. 20, 1981).
4. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, supra note 2, Annex 1-12, 30 U.S.T. at
1415-47, T.I.A.S. No. 9257, at 15-47. The 1978 Agreement superceded the 1972 Agreement.
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parties are fulfilling the commitments they have undertaken in the
Agreement.
The only existing treaty which provides mechanisms for settling
such disputes is the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom, 5 which established the basic framework
of cooperation between the United States and Canada. The Treaty was
primarily designed to protect the Great Lakes and other boundary waters
against unilateral diversions and obstructions to navigation. The IJC
was established as part of the Treaty. 6 Under the authority of the Treaty,
the IJC extended its jurisdiction to pollution control.
The Treaty contains the only two bilateral methods for resolving
water disputes between the two countries. Article X offers a formal pro-
cedure for resolving pollution (or other) disputes. It provides that:
[q]uestions or matters of difference arising between the . . . [p]arties
involving the rights, obligations, or interests of the United States or of
the Dominion of Canada either in relation to each other or to their
respective inhabitants may be referred for decision to the International
Joint Commission by the consent of the parties, it being understood
that on the part of the United States any such action will be by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate and on the part of His Maj-
esty's Government with the consent of the Governor General in
Council.
7
If the IJC commissioners cannot decide, they must issue either a joint or
separate report to their governments. The issues are then referred to an
umpire for settlement. The umpire is to be selected according to the pro-
visions of article 45 of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes.8
5. Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
6. Id. art. VII, at 2450, T.S. No. 548, at 5 (Treaties which the United States entered into prior
to 1949 are collected in C. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 (1974)).
7. Id. art. X, para. 1, at 2453, T.S. No. 548, at 7.
8. Id. para. 3, at 2453, T.S. No. 548, at 7. Article 45 of the Convention for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes provides that:
Each party appoints two Arbitrators, of whom one only can be its national or chosen
from among the persons selected by it as members of the Permanent Court. These Arbitra-
tors together choose an Umpire.
If the votes are equally divided, the choice of the Umpire is entrusted to a third
Power, selected by the parties by common accord.
If an agreement is not arrived at on this subject each party selects a different Power,
and the choice of the Umpire is made in concert by the Powers thus selected.
If, within two months' time, these two Powers cannot come to an agreement, each of
them presents two candidates taken from the list of members of the Permanent Court [of
Arbitration], exclusive of the members selected by the parties and not being nationals of




Because most disputes never rise to the level of importance at which
the parties might invoke article X of the Boundary Waters Treaty, it is
not surprising that no disputes have arisen under this provision of the
Agreement. Moreover, since the United States must get the advice and
consent of the Senate before submitting the dispute to the IJC, it is un-
likely that any dispute will ever arise under article X; certainly, none will
arise that requires immediate resolution. Thus, the one formal dispute
mechanism to which Canada and the United States have agreed for set-
tling water disputes is completely ineffective.
The other provision in the Boundary Waters Treaty concerning dis-
pute resolution is article IX, which authorizes the IJC to accept Refer-
ences from governments on specific questions. Article IX provides that
"any other questions or matters of difference arising between them in-
volving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the
other or to the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier...
shall be referred from time to time to the ... Commission for examina-
tion and report." 9 The report may include conclusions and recommen-
dations. It has the effect of an advisory opinion to governments. Article
IX specifically states that "[s]uch reports of the Commission shall not be
regarded as decisions of the questions or matters so submitted either on
the facts or the law, and shall in no way have the character of an arbitral
award." 10
The Reference procedure provides a very useful process by which
the countries can resolve important issues. References have addressed
very significant water problems: regulation of the level of the Great
Lakes,'1 pollution control in the lower Great Lakes,' 2 and water alloca-
tion in the Columbia River region.' 3 Indeed the 1978 Great Lakes Water
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, pt. IV, ch. II, art. 45,
36 Stat. 2199, 2223, T.S. No. 536, at 17.
9. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 5, at 2452, T.S. No. 548, at 6.
10. Id. art. IX, para. 3, at 2452, T.S. No. 548, at 7.
11. IJC Docket No. 82 (1964). In response to low water levels in the Great Lakes, Canada and
the United States asked the IJC in 1964 to determine whether further regulation of the Great Lakes
was necessary. The Commission issued its final report in 1976, which concluded that the "natural
regulation effect of the lakes is very efficient and only limited further improvements can be achieved
at acceptable environmental and financial costs." INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM'N, FURTHER REG-
ULATION OF THE GREAT LAKES 3 (1976).
12. IJC Docket No. 83 (1964). Canada and the United States asked the IJC to investigate the
causes and extent of pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and the international section of the St.
Lawrence River. The IJC established two technical advisory boards to conduct the investigation.
They issued a comprehensive report with findings and recommendations in 1969. After public hear-
ings, the IJC issued its report to governments two years later. This report was crucial to the negotia-
tion of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972.
13. IJC Docket No. 51 (1944). This Reference, submitted March 9, 1944, by the United States
and Canadian governments, requested the IJC to investigate "whether a greater use than is now
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Quality Agreement is viewed as a Reference under the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty. 14
While the Reference procedure continues to be a useful way to re-
solve major questions between the two countries, its usefulness is limited
when used to resolve disputes over the application and implementation of
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. Most questions will not rise
to the level of a Reference under the 1909 Agreement. Moreover, since
the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement is itself viewed as a Ref-
erence under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, a new Reference over its
application and interpretation arguably would be technically difficult.
The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement does not include
any formal provisions for resolving disputes. Article X of the Agreement
sets forth a rather limited informal means for resolving disputes by pro-
viding that a party is to notify and consult with the other party on
problems of joint concern that require "immediate response."' 5 This
provision is designed primarily for handling problems that arise which
require immediate attention; it is not designed to resolve disputes be-
tween the two countries. If a dispute arose, there is no provision for
what procedures the parties should follow in resolving it.
The absence of such dispute resolution provisions takes on greater
significance as disputes over the implementation of the Agreement and
alleged violations are likely to grow. This will occur as the cumulative
effects of seepage from landfills into the Great Lakes become more visi-
ble, as the numbers of pollutants covered by the Agreement increase, and
as the controls over such pollutants become more detailed. These dis-
putes will be significant because they will test the continued effectiveness
of the Agreement.
It is important, therefore, that dispute resolution mechanisms be put
into place before the number of such disputes multiplies, so that these
disputes can be resolved quickly and efficiently and generate minimal
conflict. The commitment to resolving disputes peacefully, implied by
the development of dispute resolution procedures, in and of itself may
being made of the waters of the Columbia River system would be feasible and advantageous." Id.
quoted in 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 851 (1964). To conduct the investi-
gation, the IJC created the International Columbia River Engineering Board. The data uncovered in
the Board's investigation led in 1960 to the inauguration of formal negotiations between the two
countries for a Columbia River agreement. These negotiations produced a formal treaty in 1961.
See Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961, United States-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
14. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, supra note 2, art. VII, § 1, 30 U.S.T. at
1393, T.I.A.S. No. 9257, at 10.
15. Id. art. X, § 2, 30 U.S.T. at 1396, T.I.A.S. No. 9257, at 13.
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contribute to minimizing conflict over the application and interpretation
of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
Both formal and informal means of resolving disputes should be in-
corporated into the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. These
procedures should be designed both to help avert or minimize disputes
and to resolve disputes after they have arisen. Some of these procedures
can be developed within the framework of the joint institutions under the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, while others should focus on
making the joint institutions useful to national dispute resolution fora.
Several dispute resolution procedures could be developed within the
Agreement to help prevent or minimize disputes. The simplest of these is
consultation between the parties, with a view to amicable resolution of
the dispute. Alternatively, one or more mediators could be appointed to
try to bring the parties to a peaceful resolution. Mediation has been suc-
cessfully used in the past.16 Experts from the Science Advisory Board or
from the Water Quality Board could serve as mediators, or an independ-
ent panel of experts could be established and members used on an ad hoc
basis to mediate disputes. Much has been written about the potential
role of mediation in environmental disputes,' 7 but there has been little
institutional formalization of it. Because mediation is a flexible dispute
resolution procedure, it seems quite appropriate for resolving ground-
water pollution controversies in the Great Lakes region.
16. In the Skagit Valley controversy between Seattle and British Columbia over the height of
the Ross Dam on the Upper Skagit River, the IJC had an important role in encouraging the parties
to settle their dispute. Two of the IJC commissioners served as mediators, together with technical
experts and individuals from both sides. They succeeded in getting the parties to reach an agree-
ment. The Skagit Valley controversy arose when the Seattle City Light electric utility began its
plans in 1967 to raise the height of the Ross Dam on the Upper Skagit River by 122.5 feet. This
would have extended the current reservoir created by the dam seven additional miles into British
Columbia and would have inundated 4720 additional acres of Canadian land. Raising the height of
the Ross Dam was the fourth stage in a sixty year program begun by the Seattle utility in 1927. This
final stage, which included a compensation agreement for the province, had been approved by the
IJC in 1942. An agreement resolving the controversy was signed by Seattle and British Columbia in
1967.
However, mounting environmental concerns caused the provincial government to change its
position in 1969. Seattle and British Columbia attempted to work out a settlement but negotiations
fell apart and in 1980 the IJC stepped in. The IJC brought the parties back to the negotiating table,
gave them a firm deadline to work within, and assured them that either could lose if an agreement
was not reached. A joint consultative group was established consisting of two IJC commissioners
(from the U.S. and Canada), experts from both sides, and individuals from Seattle and British Co-
lumbia. These efforts eventually led to the completion of a final agreement on March 30, 1984. Kirn
& Marts, The Skagit-High Ross Controversy. Negotiation and Settlement, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J.
261 (1986); R. Stein & G. Grenville-Wood, Between Neighbors: How U.S. States and Canadian
Provinces Settle Their Shared Environmental Problems 7-8 (Mar. 28-30, 1985) (paper presented at
conference on The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Policy held in Edmonton, Alberta).
17. See, e.g., Stein, The Settlement of Environmental Disputes: Towards a System of Flexible
Dispute Settlement, 12 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L LAW & COM. 283 (1985).
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More formal mechanisms may also be appropriate. It would be use-
ful for the United States and Canada to establish as part of the institu-
tional framework under the Great Lakes Agreement an independent
commission of experts which would be available to the parties to use to
investigate controversial questions and to assist in resolving disputes.
The commission could proceed much as the IJC does now in responding
to a traditional Reference under the 1909 Agreement. The commission
would conduct impartial investigations into the facts, issue a report and
on the basis of its findings offer recommendations to the parties. This
commission might be called a Commission of Inquiry.
Commissions of Inquiry date to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907,18 when they were used to investigate wartime incidents between
belligerent or neutral states. 19 After 1919, many treaties established per-
manent commissions of investigation and conciliation. 20 Countries pre-
ferred such commissions to binding arbitration because the commissions
could impartially investigate and establish facts on the basis of which
they could resolve controversies. Commissions of Inquiry have been re-
cently reinvigorated in several current international agreements, most
notably the Convention for the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. 21 The Paris-
18. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, tit. III, arts.
9-14, 32 Stat. 1779, 1787-88, U.S.T.S. No. 392, at 7; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, pt. III, arts. 9-36, 36 Stat. 2199, 2214-20, T.S. No. 536, at 11-15.
19. M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 37-41
(1943). Four Commissions of Inquiry were established under the Hague Conventions. Three of
them are discussed in the Hudson book: the 1904 North Sea Incident Inquiry (also known as the
Dogger Bank Affair), involving the firing by a Russian fleet which caused deaths, a boat loss and
other damage to a British fishing fleet; the 1912 Tavignano, Camouna and Gaulois Inquiry, regarding
the Italian seizure of a French mail steamer; and the 1921 Tubantia Inquiry, involving the sinking of
a Dutch steamship by a German submarine. Id. at 38-40. These three and the fourth commission-
the 1918 Tiger Inquiry, concerning the sinking of a Norwegian steamship in Spanish waters by a
German submarine-are extensively detailed in Nissim Bar-Yaacov's 1974 historical book on the
international use of commissions of inquiry. N. BAR-YAACOV, THE HANDLING OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF INQUIRY 45-88, 141-78 (1974).
20. See, e.g., The Inter-American Convention, Feb. 7, 1923, 44 Stat. 2070, T.S. No. 717, re-
printed in 2 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 985 (1931) (referred to as the Central
American Convention); and the Gondra Treaty, May 3, 1923, 44 Stat. 2527, T.S. No. 752, reprinted
in 2 M. HUDSON, supra, at 1006 (referred to as the Inter-American Convention). See generally N.
BAR-YAACOV, supra note 19, at 109-40; M. HABICHT, POST-WAR TREATIES FOR THE PACIFIC SET-
TLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (1931).
21. Convention for the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, art. V, para. 2, 31 U.S.T. 333, 338,
T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 6 (The Convention entered into force for the United States on Jan. 17, 1980).
Another recent usage of these commissions occurred in 1962 in the Red Crusader Inquiry. This
incident concerned the firing upon of a Scottish fishing trawler by a Danish frigate after the trawler
entered Danish fishing waters. A commission of inquiry similar to those established earlier was
created under the Hague Conventions to resolve the incident. See N. BAR-YAACOV, supra note 19,
at 179-95.
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based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has also taken note of its usefulness. The OECD report on "Re-
sponsibility and Liability of States in Relation to Transfrontier Pollu-
tion" recommended "the establishment of procedures for the settlement
of disputes in regard to transfrontier pollution problems which would not
be resolved by negotiation" and expressly noted "the possibility as need
be of setting up enquiry commissions responsible for establishing the
facts on an objective and impartial basis."' 22 Both the United States and
Canada approved the report containing the recommendation.
A commission of inquiry should be available for major disputes over
interpreting and implementing the Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment. For minor disputes, parties may wish to use less formal means of
mediation or consultation. The Commission of Inquiry could be devel-
oped as a separate, independent joint institution under the Agreement.
It would be essential to have the Commission of Inquiry separate from
the Water Quality and Science Advisory Boards and from the Regional
Office in order to protect the Commission from political interference and
to ensure that it does not become burdened with the normal operations of
these institutions.
Many disputes related to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
may be amenable to settlement through national courts or administrative
bodies. The joint institutions could potentially assist national enforce-
ment mechanisms by providing scientific expertise and/or by filing ami-
cus curiae briefs on behalf of the Commission of Inquiry. The ad hoc
panel of experts referred to earlier might be given such tasks under the
supervision of the IJC. There have been efforts in the past to establish
formal dispute resolution procedures for Great Lakes water pollution,
but they were not successful.
Early in this century when there was intense concern about pollu-
tion along the shores of the Detroit and Niagara Rivers, the United
States and Canada considered developing a formal mechanism for resolv-
ing disputes as part of a binational agreement on pollution. The IJC
recommended to both countries that it be given the authority to regulate
the pollution. The United States and Canada asked the Commission to
draft a convention or reciprocal legislation to accomplish this, which was
to include "proper provisions for the enforcement of such orders, rules,
22. ENVIRONMENTAL COMM., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., RE-
SPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY OF STATES IN RELATION TO TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 14 (1984)
(prepared in 1976 and 1979).
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and directions. ' 23 The convention was drafted, but the United States
and Canada never agreed to it. The United States objected, in particular,
to the provision that would have made the findings of the Commission
with regard to facts "final and conclusive."'24
There is some evidence, however, that this traditional aversion of
the United States and Canada to binding dispute settlement procedures
for binational controversies is changing. The recent Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 25 which is intended to remove obstacles to
trade between the countries, contains far-reaching dispute settlement
provisions. The Agreement provides for binding decisions with respect
to a broad range of trade disputes: all binational anti-dumping or coun-
tervailing duty determinations, all escape clause or article 19 of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) disputes, and other
matters affecting the Agreement to which both parties agree to submit. 26
The dispute resolution procedure outlined in the Free Trade Agree-
ment is instructive. The first stage involves written notice to the other
party of any matter which might affect the operation of the Agreement.
This is followed by consultation, and if the matter is not resolved within
thirty days, by consideration of the Canada-U.S. Trade Commission. If
the Commission is not able to resolved the dispute within thirty days, it
may refer the dispute to a binding arbitration panel for decision, or else it
must establish a panel of experts to investigate and consider the matter.
27
Certain disputes must always go to binding arbitration.
28
These procedures go substantially beyond those proposed for ad-
23. Draft Convention, Oct. 6, 1920, at 5, cited in Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A
Study in United States-Canadian Environmental Cooperation, 70 MICH. L. REV. 469, 490 (1972).
24. Bilder, supra note 23, at 490.
25. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, United States-Canada, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 293 (1988) [hereinafter FTA].
26. FTA, supra note 25, arts. 1904(1), (9), (10) (anti-dumping and countervailing duty determi-
nations); art. 1806(l)(a) (escape clause or art. 19 GATT disputes); and art. 1801(1) (other matters to
which parties agree to submit). For analysis of the dispute settlement provisions of the FTA, see
Horlick, Oliver & Steger, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT 65 (J. Schott & M. Smith eds. 1988); McDorman, The
Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free Trade Agreement, 2 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 303 (1988); and
Mitchell, Introduction to Symposium: Alternative Dispute Resolutions in Canada-United States
Trade Relations, 40 ME. L. REV. 223 (1988).
27. These procedures are contained in FTA, supra note 25, arts. 1803(1), 1804(1), 1805(1),
1806(1) and 1807(2). If the dispute is submitted to a panel of experts, the parties are not under a
legal obligation to comply with the ruling of the panel. Id. art. 1807(6).
28. Disagreement concerning chapter 11 of the FTA (Emergency Actions) must be referred by
the Commission to binding arbitration if the matter cannot be settled by the Commission. Id. art.
1806(1). Disputes regarding the use of emergency measures are to be resolved through direct negoti-
ation, intervention of the Commission, or arbitration. Id. arts. 1103, 1804, 1805 and 1806(1). The
Commission only becomes seized of the issue if one of the parties requests it. For a suggestion that
this binding arbitration may not be really binding see McDorman, supra note 26, at 317.
1989]
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dressing disputes under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The
panel of experts may perhaps be considered comparable to the proposed
Commission of Inquiry, but the provisions for binding arbitration have
no counterpart. The fact that Canada and the United States have for the
first time agreed to binding arbitral procedures suggests that the time
may be appropriate to develop dispute resolution procedures for other
subject areas, such as pollution of the Great Lakes.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the new dispute resolution
mechanisms under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement is
the provision for a binational panel to review final domestic agency or-
ders in anti-dumping or countervailing duty cases or legislative amend-
ments to either country's anti-dumping or countervailing duty laws.
29 It
could be a precedent for establishing means within the joint institutions
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement for reviewing the con-
sistency of settlement agreements, e.g. for landfills, with obligations
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. This review might
become part of the settlement process.
We have become increasingly concerned that actions taken by the
United States and Canada within their own borders may not fully com-
ply with the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. These concerns be-
come particularly acute for ground water pollution. The recent Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement suggests that it is appropriate to
think more boldly than in the past about binational procedures to ensure
compliance with the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
II. AN OMBUDSMAN FOR THE GREAT LAKES
One institutional initiative to help ensure implementation of the
Agreement would be appointment of an ombudsman for the Great Lakes
basin ecosystem. Ombudsmen were first established in Sweden to pro-
vide the parliament with the means to ensure that judges, civil servants
and military officers observed the laws. Today in Sweden, ombudsmen
inspect government agencies, courts, and prisons, investigate problems of
29. The decision of the panel in reviewing final domestic agency orders in anti-dumping and
countervailing cases is binding on both the United States and Canada. FTA, supra note 25, art.
1904(8), (9). The Agreement does provide for an extraordinary challenge procedure, which is an
appeal on very limited grounds of whether the panel's decisionmaking process was seriously flawed.
The decision on this is binding. By contrast, the panel rulings with regard to whether a legislative
amendment is consistent with the GATT and associated Codes, the FTA and prior binding decisions
by the panel under art. 1904 are not binding. Rather, the parties are obliged to engage in formal
consultations should an inconsistency be found. Id. art. 1903.
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law enforcement, and receive several thousand complaints from the pub-
lic each year.
30
Ombudsmen now operate in many countries. They are common to
many states in the United States, to most provinces of Canada, and to a
variety of nongovernmental institutions. 31 They are appointed to resolve
specific issues and to represent various constituencies which include con-
sumers, the press and children. In 1967, the state of Wisconsin estab-
lished the Office of Public Intervenor to protect the state's environment
and natural resources, which offers some precedent for establishing an
ombudsman for environmental concerns. 32
An ombudsman for the Great Lakes could bring the possible viola-
tions of the Agreement to the attention of governments, identify and
warn of dangers to water quality and to the Great Lakes Basin ecosys-
tem, and facilitate public participation in carrying out the Agreement.
The ombudsman would treat the Great Lakes as an ecosystem and con-
sider all sources of pollution, whether from direct discharges, landfills, or
airborne transport. Perhaps most importantly, an ombudsman would
serve as a signal to the Great Lakes communities that the area must be
treated as a basin-wide ecosystem and that the Agreement will be en-
forced on a basin-wide basis.
The office of ombudsman could be located within the Regional Of-
fice of the International Joint Commission. To preserve the balance be-
tween Canadian and U.S. participation in the IJC, holders of the office
could rotate on a regular basis between Canada and the United States.
These and other ideas for implementing and enforcing the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement need to be developed in more detail for
consideration by the United States and Canadian governments. The re-
port of the Royal Society of Canada and the U.S. National Research
Council, which reviewed the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, rec-
ommended that provisions for dispute resolution be added to the Agree-
ment and suggested that an ombudsman be considered for the Great
Lakes.33 With environmental concerns rising to the forefront of these
30. See SWEDISH INSTITUTE, FACT SHEETS ON SWEDEN, THE SWEDISH OMBUDSMAN (April
1981).
31. See K. WEEKS, OMBUDSMEN AROUND THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE CHART (2d ed.
1978).
32. See P. DUBOIS & A. CHRISTENSEN, PUBLIC ADVOCACY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECI-
SIONMAKING: THE WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR (1977).
33. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES & THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF
CANADA, THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN EVOLVING INSTRUMENT FOR
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 93-95, 100 (1985) (Editor's Note: Dr. Brown Weiss was a member of
the binational committee which reviewed the Agreement and drafted the report.).
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countries' agendas, it is urgent that both countries consider how to
strengthen the Agreement and expand their mutual cooperation in con-
trolling pollution in the Great Lakes.
